invariably prefers to 1 iroceed against the salesman's employer: the brokerage house itself and its partners or officers and directors. ' Although the courts generally have permitted injured investors to recover from brokerage firms for the federal securities violations of their salesmen, no uniform or consistent theory has been utilized to justify such a cause of action. The theories employed range from the accepted and conventional-liability imposed on a brokerage house as an "aider and abettor" of an employee's federal securities violation--to the novel and unique-implied private causes of action under the "diligent supervision" rules of the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] 8 and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Supp. 440 (1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account ....
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the organization.
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly after the completion of any transaction for the account of or with a customer .... The member, general partner, officer or designated person approving the opening of the account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally informed as to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature of the proposed account . . . . Reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. STocK ExcH. GumE 2405 (1970 Inc.
[NASD]. 9 However, neither of these theories is particularly useful to the injured investor, the former because of difficulties of proof 1°a nd the latter because of judicial reluctance to create such a cause of action. 1 Therefore, most investors who wish to sue a brokerage 9 . Section 27 requires each member to:
(a) [E] stablish, maintain and enforce written procedures which will enable it to supervise properly the activities of each registered representative and associated person .... (1972) .
10. Traditionally, in order to hold a brokerage firm liable as an aider-abettor a plaintiff has been required to prove both that the brokerage firm knew an illegal act was committed and that the firm rendered substantial assistance to the wrongdoer. firm under the securities acts rely on two other theories of liability: agency or "respondeat superior,"' 12 and the "controlling persons" liability provided by the federal statutes themselves. 13 The distinction between these two theories is particularly important because of the differing defenses each affords.' 4 Yet recent cases indicate marked judicial confusion over which theory sets the appropriate and "correct"
This Note will analyze the "respondeat superior" and "controlling persons" theories of brokerage firm liability. In so doing, it will suggest that the controlling persons statutes have excluded the application of common law agency principles in suits under the federal securities laws. 15 The Note will then discuss the statutory defenses of the controlling persons provisions and will conclude that, although negligence is probably sufficient for brokerage firm liability under the the 1933 Act, recklessness should be required to impose liability under the 1934 Act.
AGENCY AND CONTROLLING PERSONS LIABILITY: A COMPARISON

A
This section of the Note will compare the two most frequently used theories under which brokerage firms have been held liable for their salesmen's violations of the federal securities laws. The first theory derives from the familiar common law doctrine which makes a principal liable for misrepresentations made by an agent within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority.' 6 The second is (1973) , which concludes that it would be "inconceivable" that section 20(a) was intended to limit existing respondeat superior liability. Id. at 1041. However, since the exclusivity principle would apply only to federal causes of action which did not exist under the general law, the continued viability of causes based on common law deceit or fraud would be in no way affected by the adoption of this principle. For a discussion of the elements of this common law tort, with specific reference to the securities law context, see 3 L. Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist. 15 U.S..C § 77o (1970) . No one has adequately accounted for the differences in wording between the two sections. Presumably the reference to direct and indirect control in section 20(a) is merely a shorthand way of saying "by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise" as stated in section 15. It is more difficult to explain the difference in the defenses provided, although Loss has suggested that the good faith defense of section 20(a) is an easier defense to make. The choice of theory-agency or controlling persons liabilityis important because, under agency law, the brokerage firm is much more likely to be found liable. The broker-dealer is liable for all losses caused by the misrepresentations of an agent.
Therefore, once the fraud of the wrongdoing salesman is established, liability will almost invariably be imposed. SEC v. First Securities Co., 2 3 a receivership proceeding, illustrates the judicial propensity to construe the scope of agency broadly. There the president of the defendant brokerage firm induced fifteen of the firm's regular customers to invest in a fraudulent escrow account. While no one at First Securities except the president's secretary even knew of the escrow's existence, 24 the court cited numerous circumstances indicating that the president had in fact acted with "apparent authority": (1) the victims had all been regular brokerage clients of the company; (2) the investment recommendation was made to fourteen of the fifteen claimants in the president's office; (3) the claimants sold legitimate securities through First Securities for purposes of obtaining the necessary cash to invest in the escrow; (4) substantially all correspondence with the victims was written on letterhead stationery of First Securities; (5) much of the correspondence was typed by the president's secretary (although some correspondence was handwritten); and (6) while "interest payments" on the escrow were made by the president's personal check, the interest payments were sent in a First Securities envelope. 25 Denying that any verbal representations by the president that he was acting on behalf of his principal were essential -to the firm's liability, the Seventh Circuit held that the above circumstances sufficiently showed the president's apparent authority. 26 While the court did not specify which factors it deemed most important, agency liability probably will be imposed at least whenever the plaintiffs have been regular customers of the defendant brokerage firm, have sold stocks out of their accounts (1968) , where two employees of the defendant Kamen set up a fraudulent scheme to capture the "listed business" of non-exchange member broker-dealers for Kamen. Without the knowledge of the Kamen firm's partners, see id. at 691-92, the scheme worked by promising over-the-counter broker-dealers that Kamen would channel certain business in non-listed securities back to them. Broker A was called and told to purchase a certain number of valueless shares of a certain company from Broker B at a specific price and to sell the shares to Broker C at a slightly higher price. Unknown to Broker A, Broker C was then told to purchase the shares from [Vol. 1974:824 Under the controlling persons sections of -the securities acts, on the other hand, the defendant broker-dealer is given two defenses. First, just as a brokerage firm can under the common law principles of agency contend the firm did not expressly or apparently authorize the alleged agent's acts, the brokerage firm can, under the controlling perons provisions, contend it did not "contror' the wrongdoing salesman. " However, the importance of this first defense should not be overstated. It is, in fact, less helpful to a defendant brokerage house than is the "lack of an agency" defense. The reason is that the definition of agency is much narrower than that of a control relationship." The former is defined as a relation created by a manifestation of willingness and consent by both the agent and the principal that the agent is to act for the principal. 37 The latter, however, can exist without a principal-agent relationship. 38 Broker A and to sell them to Broker D at a still higher price, and so on. Id. at 692. Aschkar, the plaintiff, was one of those induced to buy the stock, but just at that time the scheme collapsed, and the plaintiff was left without a purchaser. Id. at 692-93. The Ninth Circuit held that, while the salesmen were unquestionably agents of the defendant brokerage firm, they had neither actual nor "ostensible" (apparent) authority to carry on their fraudulent activities. The court explained that "ostensible" authority arises as a result of conduct of the principal which causes the third party reasonably to believe that the agent possesses the authority to act on the principal's behalf. Id. at 695. Here, however, any reliance on the agent's authority was clearly unreasonable since Aschkar knew that guaranteed profit sales violated exchange rules. Id. at 696. Therefore, the Kamen firm could not be held liable under agency principles. Id.
A [1972 [ -1973 having in fact exercised control. 40 The second defense-and the one which makes liability under the controlling persons sections more difficult to establish than under transplanted agency principles-is provided by the express statutory language. Section 20(a) imposes liability "unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action. ' 41 Section 15 results in liability "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist. 42 These defenses, although by no means an absolute bar to recovery, 4 a are at least formidable enough to encourage plaintiffs to place foremost reliance on agency principles in a cause of action for a federal securities violation. Only in the absence of an employment relationship between salesman and broker-dealer, where an agency relationship might be difficult to establish, would the investor 'by choice rely upon the controlling persons sections. 44
AmE THE CONTROLLING PERSONS SECTIONS ExcLuSivE?
One of the most unsettled questions in securities law is whether or not the controlling persons sections are exclusive in a federal cause of action, thus preventing imposition of the strict liability flowing from general agency principles. 45 The District Court -for the Southern District of New York has twice upheld exclusivity. 46 At least five other courts have applied agency principles instead of the relevant controlling persons section, thus stripping the firm of its statutory defenses. 47 Some courts have considered both theories, although most such cases have held the defendant brokerage house inculpable under both. 4 8 No case appears to have arisen where the "good faith" defense was satisfied but the strict liability of the agency relationship was nevertheless imposed. Thus, the courts' consideration of agency principles, which provide far less readily available defenses than the controlling persons statutes, has not yet been detrimental to defendants. However, [1972] [1973] House version, while imposing liability on directors for false registration statements, did not contain either a "dummy" provision or a controlling persons provision. 5 " In conference, the Senate provision became the present section 15 of the 1933 Act. 54 Thus, arguably section 15 was merely the result of congressional concern with the special problems presented by the use of dummy directors and was not designed to cover the salesman-brokerage firm relationship.
This justification for a standard of strict liability flowing from the agency relationship is insufficient for two reasons. First, it fails to explain why section 15 is written in much more general terms than the original Senate provision. A House report describing the amendment to section 15, which added the scienter test for controlling persons liability, is written in equally broad terms. 55 The report contains no hint that section 15, clear on its face, is limited in its application. Second, even assuming that section 15 was not meant to apply to employment relationships, there is no similar legislative history mandating such a limitation on section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. 5 " On the contrary, the legislative history indicates that Congress intended a very broad definition of control:
In . 1974) . Interestingly, the other three courts which have applied agency principles instead of the controlling persons sections in suits against brokerage houses for their salesmen's misconduct, see cases cited in note 47 supra, have not even considered the possible applicability of the Hutton & Co., a brokerage firm, to rescind the University's purchase of an oil and gas production payment on the ground that a Hutton employee had falsely predicted future net revenues for the oil wells. The district court held that the controlling persons liability of section 15 merely supplements common law principles of agency and respondeat superior. 5 9
The legislative history and case law, to the extent -there is any, would appear to buttress a contruction of section 15 to exclude application of -the latter -to an employment relationship. A contrary conclusion would in effect give blessing to a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil approach by partners of a brokerage house which is hardly in keeping with the remedial purposes of the '33 Act .... 60 If Hutton escaped liability because its partners had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the employee's misrepresentations, the court speculated, then the partners in a brokerage house could insulate themselves from liability under the federal securities acts by simply ignoring employee sales practices. 6 ' Although the Fourth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the district court, 62 the fear that brokerage houses would frequently escape section 15 liability when they would have been held culpable under a strict liability standard is probably not justified. The words "reasonable grounds to believe" should be construed to impose liability where the employer should have known of the salesman's fradulent conduct or the likelihood thereof. 6 3 Furthermore, under the 1934 Act, the intentional disregard controlling persons provisions.
Besides this judicial support for the contention that the controlling persons provisions do not supplant agency liability, two commentators, Professors Bromberg and Ruder, also agree with the non-exclusivity view. See 1 BROMBERG § 6.1(100), at 107 n.11; Ruder 608. Not surprisingly, the SEC has taken a similar position. 1968 ). This was a suit against the issuing corporation for the fraudulent conduct of its underwriter. The court, although exculpating the defendant from liability under section 15, inquired not only into the defendant's actual knowledge of the fraud but also into the issuer's exercise of reasonable care in investigating the underwriter. Id. at 842-43.
of employee sales practices would certainly be evidence of blatant bad faith.
An additional argument against the exclusivity of the controlling persons sections can be based on the language of section 28(a) of the 1934 Act: "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity . . ."3 This argument appears to be the basis for the Seventh Circuit's recent holding in Fey v. Walston & Co. 5 that section 20(a) does not exclude federal securities liability predicated upon agency principles. While the court did not expressly cite section 28(a), the Seventh Circuit stated that "the mere existence of remedial provisions in the Securities Acts does not foreclose the application of similar common law remedies." 6 An analogy can also be drawn to a line of cases holding that remedies under the federal securities acts are cumulative, not mutually exclusive, and that therefore an implied cause of action exists under rule 10b-5 despite the availability of another remedy under an express civil liability section. 07 However, such an importation of agency principles into the federal securities laws will often render the controlling persons sections superfluous in a context to which they clearly apply: the control re- 65. 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974). In Fey the plaintiff, a widow, alleged that her account had been churned and brought suit under rule 10b-5. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $18,227.04. On appeal the defendant brokerage firm complained that the court failed adequately to instruct the jury as to the statutory defense provided by section 20(a). The Seventh Circuit held that even if the charge were erroneous, the defendant could not complain since the firm could be held liable for its employee's 10b-5 violation under respondeat superior and therefore had obtained a more favorable instruction than it was entitled to. Id. at 1052. The case, however, was reversed and remanded because other charges were found to be erroneous. 66. Id. at 1052 n.18. The court went on to state that the converse was also true: a statutory remedy may be invoked even though the proof is insufficient to sustain a corresponding common law remedy. Id. As further authority for its holding the court cited Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) , in which a defendant bank was held "coextensively" liable for the 10b-5 violation of its officer-employees. The Court, however, did not give any reasons for its holding. Whatever theory the Court had in mind, the case is clearly distinguishable from suits against brokerage houses for their salesmen's acts. A corporation is always liable for the fraudulent acts of its officers-as distinguished from lower level employees-since the acts of the officers are imputed to the corporation. lationship of a broker-dealer and its employees. 0 While section 28(a) does provide that the rights and remedies under the 1934 Act are in addition to those granted by common law, this section was merely meant to preserve actions for common law fraud or deceit. 6 9 A plaintiff should not, in the interest of fairness, be permitted to sue under one of the broad federal antifraud provisions and, at the same time, hold the defendant broker-dealer absolutely liable in derogation of the defenses provided as part of the same statutory scheme. When the cause of action is based upon the federal securities laws, the liability of the defendant brokerage firm should be determined under the appropriate controlling persons section. On the other 'hand, if a plaintiff further alleges common law fraud or deceit by the salesman, then the liability of the broker-dealer for that additional count should be determined under common law agency principles. 70 Of course, under the appropriate facts a defendant can be held liable under both theories,-* but the two causes of action allow the broker different defenses, and the two standards of liability should not be confused. This argument was suggested in Moscarelli v. Stamm 2 where the court, by way of dictum, stated that "[w]hich provision is applicable may depend upon whether the cause of action is predicated upon a statutory tort under the federal securities laws or upon a common law -tort. 73 The foregoing section has considered and rejected the various arguments for coexistence, within a federal securities act cause of action, of agency and controlling persons liability. Finally, it must be emphasized that the strongest argument for the exclusivity of the standard of liability of the controlling persons sections arises from the statutory language itself. This contention has received judicial recognition only recently in SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 74 an enforcement proceeding under rule lOb-5 against Lehman Brothers and a registered representative for "tipping" a major institutional client regarding an expected earnings decline in Lum's stock. 78 In holding that liability could not be imposed on Lehman Brothers without regard to any possible lack of "fault," the court carefully examined the language of the controlling persons sections. On their face, the court noted, the sections would seem to cover the employer-employee situation, 7 Nevertheless, the court in Lum's read Lanza as authority for imposing liability on Lehman Brothers under section 20(a) for the acts of the employee-salesman. 365 F. Supp. at 1063. Despite this construction, the court declined to apply Lanza or the controlling persons sections to Lum's itself. Rather, since the court could not conceive of a corporation acting in any other way than through its officers and directors, Lum's was held liable under agency principles for the act of its "tipping" director. Once it is accepted that the controlling persons sections are the appropriate standard for determining the liability of a brokerage firm for the federal securities violations of its salesmen, the final issue for determination is the breadth of the broker-dealer's statutory defenses.
It has been suggested that the 1934 Act gives the controlling person a seemingly readier defense than the 1933 Act. Under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act the controlling person need prove only that he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action," whereas under section 15 of the 1933 Act the controlling person must prove that he "had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."
However, because of the broad scope of rule 10b-5, most suits by investors against broker-dealers and their employees fall under the 1934 Act 8 3 despite the greater difficulty in overcoming defenses, and therefore few cases have construed the controlling persons section of the 1933 Act. The best construction, however, appears to be that, in order to escape liability under section 15, controlling persons must exercise the "reasonable care" of a "person of ordinary prudence" to ascertain violations of the federal securities acts. 84 This construction implies some burden of investigation into the conduct of the controlled person, and, if reasonable care is given its common law meaning, then a brokerage firm which is merely negligent in its supervision of salesmen may nonetheless be held liable. v. Watson," 6 an action brought by an elderly couple who alleged churning of their account at Bioren & Co.8 In denying summary judgment for the defendant brokerage house, the court held that in order to satisfy the requirement of good faith, the defendants had to show that some precautionary measures were taken and enforced to prevent the injury suffered. 8 under section 20(a). 96 The strictness of the requisite supervision is readily apparent if even the daily activities of the firm president must come within the scrutiny of a watchdog system of checks and balances. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 7 a brokerage firm was held liable for its salesman's churning of an account where, in contravention of the firm's own rules requiring special treatment for female customers' commodities accounts, Ms. Hecht's account was opened and her portfolio traded with only the informal approval of a partner. 9 8 The defendant brokerage house had also failed to make any subsequent investigation or check of the account, even though the record showed that it was among the most actively traded and had in fact generated more than half of the salesman's commissions. 9 9 It is unclear from the court's opinion whether the mere failure to give special treatment to a woman's account constitutes lack of diligent supervision. Such a holding, resting on the assumption that female traders are less knowledgeable than their male counterparts, would seem peculiarly unenlightened.
Since the court was also careful to note that the plaintiff was a widow, retired, and depended on the account for her income, 100 the better conclusion to be drawn is that a brokerage firm -must make a reasonable and continuing inquiry into the financial circumstances, trading experience, and investment objectives of each customer-especially those whose accounts are among the firm's most actively traded.
On the other hand, in Lum's, where a salesman violated rule 10b-5 by leaking inside information, the court found the defendant brokerage firm had satisfied the defense of good faith by pointing to a system of adequate and reasonable supervision.
1 ' 0 Lehman Brothers maintained a "compliance department" staffed by competent attorneys who periodically met with the salesmen.
02
Memoranda apprising salesmen of current developments in securities law were regularly circulated. 1 0 3 A book of guidelines and a video tape concerning rule lOb-5 problems were distributed to all branch offices.' 04 The court also 
Id.
noted that the guilty salesman was a respected and trusted employee, on whose judgment Lehman could reasonably rely. 0 5 While Lehman did not at that time have a rule prohibiting salesmen from contacting the management of corporations whose securities were held by clients, the court did not feel the absence of such a rule negated the good faith defense.
6
The "objectification" of the good faith defense has conveniently served to make the defense manageable. While good faith is traditionally measured by the defendant's intent, purpose, or motive rather than by his due diligence or care, 10 7 it is much easier to screen the adequacy of a 'broker-dealer's supervisory procedures than it is to probe the corporate mind of Merrill Lynch. But in loosely equating good faith with non-negligent supervision, the courts are suggesting an erroneous standard. Certainly, stringent supervisory procedures are important evidence of an employer's good faith. Bad faith, however, is not the same as mere negligence, but rather requires a showing of scienter or conduct which is intentional or reckless in nature. 109 Just as negligent conduct is probably not sufficient to establish liability in a private damage action under rule 10b-5, 00 a negligent failure to supervise should not justify the imposition of liability on a brokerage firm for the acts of its employee when the firm is sued by a private investor. The standard should be different from that applied under the NYSE or NASD "diligent supervison" rules or in an administrative proceeding by -the SEC. In Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar no bad faith by the defendant broker-dealer in its selection and supervision of employees' 1 ' even though, on .the same set of facts, the SEC had temporarily suspended -the defendant from the national securities exchanges and the NASD on the ground there was negligence under the standards of the diligent supervision rules." 2 But other courts, carelessly speaking in terms of negligence rather than of a reckless or willful failure to supervise employees, could easily, in a laudable attempt to objectify the good faith standard, oversimplify the defense to the point where even slight negligence nullifies the broker-dealer's good faith." 3 CONCLUSION Two different theories of broker-dealer liability for the federal securities violations of salesmen have been discussed herein: "respondeat superior" or agency liability, and liability under the controlling persons sections of the securities acts. Once the existence of an agency relationship has been established, the employer's liability is absolute. Since most suits involve misrepresentations by employee-salesmen clearly acting within the scope of their employment, the "lack of an agency" defense is relatively unimportant. The controlling persons sections, however, while ensnaring more than merely the agents of the brokerage firm, provide the broker-dealer with valuable statutory defenses. Therefore, injured investors will generally prefer to utilize an agency theory of liability.
Several courts have allowed respondeat superior as a method of imposing secondary liability on brokerage firms for their salesmen's violations of the federal securities acts. However, the better reasoning appears to be that the controlling persons provisions of these acts have excluded agency liability for such violations. As a matter of policy, if a plaintiff has elected to sue for violation of one of the federal antifraud provisions, he should not then be able to impose absolute liability on the brokerage firm in blind disregard of the broker's defenses allowed under the controlling persons sections. Moreover, -the 113. Under this standard, the reasoning in First Securities should not be followed, since a brokerage firm which merely omits to inspect its president's mail can hardly be deemed to be acting in bad faith. On the other hand, Hecht was probably correctly decided even under a bad faith standard in view of the fact the wrongdoing salesman was earning half of his commissions from the plaintiffs account and no investigation of the account was ever undertaken.
controlling persons provisions, defining "contror' specifically in terms of agency, would, on their face, seem to exclude liability based on common law agency principles.
Given the exclusivity of the controlling persons provisions in federal securities suits, the most important remaining issue is the nature of the statutory defenses. Although negligence is probably sufficient misconduct to justify liability under the Securities Act, a broker-dealer should not be held liable under the 1934 Act if it sustains the burden of good faith by showing it was not reckless in the supervision of employees. While many courts appear to impose a higher burden, requiring the broker-dealer to show no negligence in its supervisory procedures, such a construction is an unwarranted interpretation of the good faith defense. The courts' understandable concern that a subjective standard might be difficult to apply should not be permitted to obscure the clear statutory language.
